Current Turkish policy is out of tune with its allies and exposes the strategic and operational ambiguity of a NATO member making odd choices.

Turkish upcoming elections set multifaceted dilemmas not only in a heavily polarized domestic electoral milieu but also to the international community as well as to its NATO allies.

The outcome will define the character of the Turkish state and its strategic positioning in a transition era.

On the domestic level, elections bring Turkey closer to a constitutional despotocracy. The winner will be the absolute ruler of the country, while its political opponents will face a domestic order within which the domestic Leviathan will be non-existent. The few weeks remaining to elections will be almost by default characterized by polarization and the desire of Erdogan to undermine looming economic problems to be dealt with after he has secured his role as the undisputed ruler of the country.

During the last few years, Erdogan’s policies have questioned the validity, balance logic and organizational order of the post-Second World War order. His strategic choices concerning alliances have questioned in essence the Truman Doctrine and the unity of NATO. The intensity of his policy of strategically approaching Moscow (i.e. S-400) along with his determination to turn Turkey into a regime, set dilemmas to the EU, the US, NATO and its neighbors.

Turkey has never distanced itself so much from the basis of its nominal and strategic milieu, that is the West. The fallacy that undefined foreign powers are operating against Turkish national interests and threaten its very survival (in IR terms) is a far-fetched, unfounded misbelieve.

We could use elements of the logic of perceptions and misperceptions in international relations to decode this attitude. Robert Jervis points to two major issues. The first relates to the environment a leader operates (operational milieu) and the second on the psychological milieu. Following this cognitive evaluation, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems to underestimate geography and the way it has affected the overall balance of power in the region. Turkey was a pivotal parameter of the formulated post-Second World War order.

Certain elements of the loss of this balance have led to an inability to stabilize the Middle East. The psychological milieu points to the cognitive elements that led Erdogan to the formulation of evaluative judgments or misjudgments concerning the role and future of Turkey. Verbally he underpins his nominal aim to join the EU, yet, this was set within a take-it or leave-it policy. That is full membership or distancing the country from Europe.

This is a major deviation from long-term Turkish strategy, yet, the most serious issues stem from choices that question, in essence, the Truman Doctrine that meant to keep Greece and Turkey within the Western alliance. Erdogan seems to question the traditional established alliances of the country and its positioning.

History, politics, and geography have determined Turkey’s “fate” as part of the Western alliance. Any attempt to derail this course sets major challenges to an order that meant to accommodate south-east Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean in a way that eliminates “interference.” The Truman Doctrine has been a landmark of Turkey’s (and Greece’s) strategic positioning. It aimed at securing vital strategic space against Communist expansion.

Today Erdogan’s policies constitute a threat to this zone and facilitate Russia’s intruding policies. In effect these ram NATO’s most vulnerable zone, south-east European flank.

Erdogan’s siding with Russia risks an overall upset of an established order that defined policies, opportunities, and limitations to expansion as well as the ability to provide a working modus operandi in a region where geopolitics have historically and operationally defined what is acceptable by intruding great powers. Current Turkish policy is out of tune with its allies and exposes the strategic and operational ambiguity of a NATO member making odd choices (i.e the acquisition of Russian defense systems).

In a way Erdogan’s revised policy towards Russia constitutes new (“revisionist”) input in a complex geographical region where systemic and sub-systemic elements overlap. If the overlapping systems are to be eufunctional, then a number of defining parameters need to be accepted and Turkey’s positioning within the Western sphere is one of them.

If geography defines security, then it also defines alternatives (expansion, limitations), based on critical choices made in the past. “Looking at the map is enough to see Turkey’s importance” suggested NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. This eventually depicts the challenges set by Erdogan’s choices and the way it upsets the balance of power and balance of interests.

George Voskopoulos is Associate Professor of European Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece. Read other articles by George.